EDRStartupHinder: New Tool Abuses Windows Bindlinks to Hinder EDR

Occasionally, circumventing Windows‘ security apparatus does not necessitate a direct assault on the antivirus software itself; rather, it is sufficient to orchestrate a scenario in which the software fails to initialize correctly. A security researcher operating under the moniker Two Seven One Three (TwoSevenOneT) has disseminated a utility on GitHub entitled EDRStartupHinder. This tool is engineered to obstruct the activation of antivirus and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions during the system’s boot sequence by exploiting a legitimate Windows path redirection mechanism.

The quintessence of this concept lies in Bindlink, an API that facilitates the “binding” of a local virtual path to an alternative location, thereby enabling the transparent redirection of file access requests. Microsoft defines Bind Links as a method for redirecting file system namespaces via the bindflt.sys driver—a feature originally intended for compatibility scenarios where files must appear local despite residing elsewhere.

The architects of EDRStartupHinder weaponize this mechanism within an offensive framework. During the Windows startup phase, the utility establishes a redirection for a critical DLL within the System32 directory. Consequently, the targeted security process receives an “incompatible” version of the library and terminates abruptly. The project documentation explicitly states that the tool prevents the launch of Antivirus and EDR by rerouting essential System32 dependencies at the embryonic stage of the boot process.

Why does this technique prove efficacious against modern defensive products? The Zero Salarium article referenced in the repository elucidates the underlying logic: many defensive processes initialize as Protected Process Light (PPL) and maintain stringent requirements regarding the binaries they are permitted to load. If a critical dependency is substituted prematurely so that it fails verification, the security process may “self-neutralize” before its self-protection mechanisms have even materialized. The author asserts that this methodology was successfully validated against Windows Defender on Windows 11 version 25H2, noting that the technique was also tested against several unrevealed commercial solutions.

The debut of “Version 1.0” on January 11, 2026, serves as another poignant illustration of how features conceived for convenience and compatibility are repurposed as instruments for evasion. This is particularly salient during the early boot phase, where an adversary possesses the opportunity to achieve temporal precedence over defensive measures.

For defenders, the primary concern is not merely the specific binary, but the entire class of technique. The Zero Salarium publication advocates for the rigorous monitoring of Bindlink usage—specifically activity surrounding bindlink.dll—and the emergence of suspicious, early-launch services that might precede EDR components. Should anomalous “compatibility” services manifest within an infrastructure alongside the sudden evaporation of standard protection post-reboot, it represents the exact sequence of events that warrants immediate forensic investigation.